A sender wishes to transmit a secret to a receiver through a communication network, where some nodes are controlled by an adversary. We characterize the directed networks for which there exist ε-secret and ε-strongly secure communication protocols (∀ε > 0): if all nodes are obedient the receiver learns the secret with probability at least 1 − ε and no information is leaked (secrecy), and this property is maintained under every strategy of the adversary (security). For secrecy, a necessary and sufficient condition is that there is a directed path from the sender to the receiver, and for each possible adversarial coalition A, there is an undirected path from the sender to the receiver that contains no node in A. For security, a necessary and sufficient condition is that for every possible adversarial coalition A, the graph obtained by removing all nodes in A still has the previous property.
Introduction
The problem. This paper studies the problem of secure transmission of messages between a sender and a receiver on a network. The sender wishes to transmit a secret (private information) to the receiver through the network. The difficulty is that nodes might be curious, faulty, and malevolent (for short, adversarial), and that the identity of adversarial nodes is unknown to the sender and receiver. Nodes (players) in the network receive messages on in-going edges and send messages on out-going edges.
A communication protocol specifies the messages nodes can receive and send at each round of communication (a game-form) and the messages nodes send at each round as a function of the messages received and sent in all previous rounds (a strategy profile).
A communication protocol is strongly secure if it satisfies (i) secrecy: if the nodes correctly execute the protocol, the receiver correctly learns the secret of the sender and no information is leaked, and (ii) security/reliability: even if a group of nodes (an adversary) mis-execute the protocol, no information is leaked and the receiver learns the secret with arbitrary high probability. This paper characterizes the networks for which there exists a strongly secure communication protocol.
Motivation.
Problems of secure transmission of messages are natural in computer science where a communication network represents agents sending messages (emails) along physical wires and adversarial players are hackers. Since the very beginning of electronic communication, security of messages has been a central concern, and there is a large literature on these issues (on communication networks and secure transmission of messages, see e.g., Dolev et al, 1993, or Franklin and Wright, 2000) . The present paper contributes to this literature in considering the general class of directed networks; most of this literature considers undirected networks. We explain in greater details the connections of our work with this literature in a later section.
Yet, the primary motivation for our work is the study of game theoretic problems.
Indeed, problems of secure transmission of messages are easily formalized as dynamic games. As a first example, consider a modelà la Crawford and Sobel (1982) in which the sender and the receiver have common interests. If the sender could communicate directly with the receiver, the most efficient equilibrium would be for the sender to report truthfully his private information. Suppose now that the sender and the receiver are distant nodes in the network and that some other players (nodes) have opposite interests. The possibility of achieving perfect communication in equilibrium is tightly related to the existence of a secure communication protocol: if such a protocol exists, then no player can alter communication by deviating, interpreting a deviation as adversarial behavior. The equivalence between secure communication protocols and fully revealing equilibria in cheap-talk games with incomplete information is studied in details in Renault and Tomala (2004) .
As a second example, Monderer and Tennenholtz (1999) and Renou and Tomala (2012) study mechanism design problems when not all agents are able to directly and privately communicate with the principal 1 . The information agents like to transmit to the principal has to go through a network (the hierarchy). If one wants to implement any incentive-compatible social choice function, the problem is essentially a problem of secure transmission of messages. Intuitively, any agent must be able to securely and reliably transmit his private information to the principal. If not, either the principal receives an erroneous information and thus does not implement the right decision, or agents might have an incentive to mis-report their private information, if information about the private information of others is leaked to them.
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As another example, consider an infinitely repeated game. If players want to enforce a cooperative behavior (e.g., monopoly pricing), players may need to punish the deviating players upon detecting deviations from the cooperative behavior. Detecting and punishing a deviating player may prove particularly difficult if monitoring is imperfect and private, see Mailath and Samuelson (2006) . For instance, suppose, that players are on a network and can only observe the actions of their neighbors. To enforce the cooperative behavior, players observing a deviation from a neighbor would need to reliably signal the identity of the deviator (the private information) to the other players in order for the punishment phase to start. Ben-Porath and Kahneman (1996) and Renault and Tomala (1998) Our central result is to characterize the directed networks for which strongly secure transmission of messages is possible. We start by assuming that for each node i, there exists a directed path from i to the receiver. This is without loss of generality. Clearly, the sender must have a directed path to the receiver if he is to transmit his secret.
Suppose now that there is a non-empty set of nodes with no directed path to the receiver. All these nodes cannot send messages to the other nodes, i.e., the nodes with a directed path to the receiver, and are therefore irrelevant for the transmission of messages from the sender to the receiver. There is thus no loss of generality in removing such nodes from the network.
With this preparation done, as a first step, we study the problem of secret communication, that is, communication protocols such that, if all players execute the protocol obediently, then the receiver learns the secret, and the messages jointly obtained by any 3 Note that Dolev et al (1993) A building block of our main proof is a secret sharing protocol (see, e.g., Shamir, 1979 , and Beimel, 2011, for a recent survey). The sender (the dealer) breaks the secret into a number of shares (one share per neighbor) such that all shares are required for recovering the secret, and no information is leaked. In turn, each neighbor of the sender must deal shares of their "secret" (i.e., all messages they have received and keys generated) to their immediate neighbors, and so on. The core of the proof is to show that no adversarial coalition can obtain enough shares to learn the secret. Another aspect is that any adversarial coalition can mis-execute the protocol. From a computer science viewpoint, this corresponds to potentially dishonest dealers and shareholders and, thus, corresponds to verifiable secret sharing schemes (see, e.g., Chor et al., 1985) .
There is also a large literature in computer science that studies rational secret sharing in game-theoretic terms (see among others Abraham et al., 2006 , Gordon and Katz, 2006 , Halpern and Teague, 2004 , Kol and Naor, 2008 . This literature provides an important bridge between computer science and game theory, since nodes can be rational entities (firms, consumers, voters, etc) that respond to incentives, as the above economic examples attest. Our work also adopts this view. We stress, however, that the main contribution of the paper is about the topology of the network for which secure information transmission is possible, and not about the protocols for secret sharing.
An important technical result for our analysis is the cut lemma. Suppose that the nodes of the graph of communication are partitioned into three subsets S, A, and R such that the sender is in S, the receiver is in R, and all paths from S to R intercept A, so that A is a cut of the graph. The cut lemma states that if the histories of messages received and sent by A are independent of the histories of messages received and sent by S, so are the histories of R. A direct consequence is that if A does not learn the secret of S, then R does not either. This result is often referred to in computer science, and the usual strategy of proof is based on entropy (see e.g, Maurer, 1999).
However, this type of proof does not extend easily to directed networks (see Lemma 2 below and the example following it). To contrast with, our proof uses an auxiliary three-player repeated game with an imperfect information structure that replicates the structure of observation implied by the network. This demonstrates the power of the game-theoretic language.
Related literature. This paper contributes to the literature on secure transmission of messages. Dolev et al. (1993) consider undirected networks composed of n vertexdisjoint paths from the sender to the receiver, unicast communication, and assume that an adversary controls at most k nodes. 4 These authors show that in 1-way problems,
i.e., if the information flows only from the sender to the receiver, a sufficient and necessary condition for the secure transmission of information is the 3k + 1-connectivity of the network, while in 2-way problems, i.e., when the sender and the receiver "converse," a sufficient and necessary condition is the 2k + 1-connectivity of the network.
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Similarly, considering undirected but broadcast networks, Franklin and Wright (2000) show that a necessary and sufficient condition for the secure transmission of messages is the 2k + 1-connectivity of the network. Renault and Tomala (2008) and sufficient for perfect security, i.e., when with probability one the receiver correctly learns the secret and no information is leaked.
(but still composed of vertex-disjoint paths), Desmedt and Wang (2002) show that if there are 3k + 1 − u ≥ 2k + 1 disjoint paths from the sender to the receiver and u disjoint paths from the receiver to the sender (these u paths are also disjoint from the 3k + 1 − u paths from the sender to the receiver), then perfectly secure transmission of messages can be achieved.
Our main contribution to this literature is to consider general directed networks and general adversaries. 
Communication on networks
This section presents our model of communication on networks and defines the concepts of information-theoretic secrecy and security. We define communication protocols and strategies using concepts and terminologies borrowed from game theory.
The communication network.
A sender S and a receiver R are two distant nodes in a directed graph, or digraph, 
Strategies and protocols.
A communication protocol on a digraph G is informally described as follows. There are multiple rounds and, at each round, a set of players is active and send messages to their successors. Communication is assumed to be synchronous: at a given round, all messages are sent simultaneously, and each player is only informed of the messages he has sent and received before that round; unicast: a player can send different messages to different successors; and randomized: messages may depend on random inputs privately chosen. A protocol specifies message spaces, the strategy used by each player to generate the messages he sends, given the messages he received and his random inputs, and how the receiver decodes the secret from his messages.
More formally, players communicate for T < ∞ rounds. At each round t ≤ T ,
We assume that all message spaces are finite and that there exists a null (silent) message m 0 ∈ M t ij for all i, for all j ∈ C(i), for all t. A period-t history h t i for player i is the list of messages received and sent before round t and is an element of H
6 A period-t strategy for the sender is a map σ all the messages he has received and sent, the receiver can either output a secret or declares that there is a problem. For instance, if the receiver is confronted with two incompatible messages like "the secret is θ" and "the secret is θ * ", he might simply declare that there is a problem instead of choosing a particular secret. Let σ, θ d be a communication protocol, denote P σ the probability distribution over histories and secrets induced by the strategy profile σ. By convention, we assume that if the history h t has probability zero under σ, then P σ (θ = θ|h t ) is defined as P (θ = θ).
Note that a profile of strategies σ together with a decoding function θ d induce a random
Adversaries.
There is a collection A of potential adversaries. Each A ∈ A is a subset of V \ {S, R}.
For instance, given an integer k, A may be the collection of all subsets of V \ {S, R}
with at most k elements. We allow an adversary to correlate its play, i.e., we allow for strategies of the form τ
i . An adversary A can condition its play at round t on all messages sent and received by all nodes in A up to round t. Implicitly, players in A have access to an underlying communication network to share their information and are not constrained by the network G.
The goal of the sender is to send a message to the receiver without the adversary being able to learn or to manipulate the content of the message (the secret). 
Secrecy and security. Definition 2 A protocol σ, θ d is ε-secret if it satisfies the following requirements:
7 Here, we have in mind that the sender and the receiver are better off when the receiver correctly outputs the secret of the sender. For instance, suppose that upon decoding the secret to be θ , the receiver takes decision f (θ ). Assume that the sender and the receiver have the utility function u with
, while any other node has the utility function −u. Clearly, the receiver and the sender are better off when the receiver correctly outputs the secret, while all other nodes are worse off. If they can, they will disrupt the communication.
The receiver learns the secret with probability at least
1 − ε, that is, ∀θ ∈ Θ, P σ (θ d =θ|θ = θ) ≥ 1 − ε.
No adversary gets information about the secret, that is, ∀A ∈ A, ∀h
A communication protocol is ε-secret if the receiver learns the private information (secret) of the sender with arbitrarily high probability and no adversary A with unbounded computational power controlling all nodes in A (and knowing the protocol) gains additional information about the secret. Notice that the probabilities are evaluated under σ, i.e., whenever the players correctly execute the protocol. This type of adversary is referred to as "honest but curious" in the computer science literature.
We now consider a stronger requirement: the protocol must be secret whenever the players abide by the protocol, and if an adversary deviates from the protocol, the deviation is detected with arbitrarily high probability. An important motivation for this stronger requirement comes from mechanism design models (see Renou and Tomala, 2012) where the receiver is a decision maker who takes an action that affects the utility of all players, even adversarial ones. For instance, suppose that upon detecting a deviation, the receiver can take an action that imposes a large punishment on all the players. The threat of a punishment upon detection, which would happen with a large probability if the protocol has the aforementioned properties, would then deter players from deviating, i.e., to become adversarial.
Definition 3 A protocol σ, θ d is ε-secret with δ-detection if it is ε-secret and satisfies
the following additional requirement:
If an adversary deviates from the protocol, the receiver either correctly learns the secret or detects a problem, i.e., for all
Note that if a communication protocol is secret with detection, the receiver detects with arbitrary high probability a deviation from the protocol, but may not learn the secret upon detection of the deviation. The next concept we introduce imposes that even if an adversary deviates, the protocol remains secret, i.e., the receiver still learns the secret with high probability and no other players get additional information about the secret.
Definition 4 A protocol σ, θ d is ε-strongly secure if for any adversary A and any
deviation τ A from the protocol, 1. The receiver learns the secret with probability at least 1 − ε, that is, ∀θ ∈ Θ,
No adversary gets information about the secret, that is, ∀A ∈ A, ∀h
T +1 A , ∀θ ∈ Θ, P τ A ,σ −A (θ = θ|h T +1 A ) = P (θ = θ).
In other words, for any adversary
A communication protocol is ε-strongly secure if it is ε-secret, and even if an adversary deviates from the protocol, the receiver still learns the secret with high probability and no other adversary gets additional information about the secret. This is stronger than the classical definition of security in computer science. Indeed, the classical definition requires that the receiver correctly learns the secret even if an adversary deviates from the protocol, that no adversary gains information by deviating, but does not require further secrecy requirement following a deviation. In particular, it might be that for the receiver to learn the secret after a deviation, other nodes have to learn it too, see the concluding example. Note that if a protocol is ε-strongly secure, then it is clearly ε-secret with ε-detection (i.e., Definition 4 implies Definition 3).
Connectivity.
Security and secrecy clearly cannot be achieved for all graphs and all adversaries. For instance, this is impossible if the adversary controls all nodes in the network and if the receiver is not a successor of the sender. We introduce now some connectivity conditions.
A directed path (dipath) γ is a finite sequence of vertices (i 1 , . . . , i n ) such that i k+1 ∈ C(i k ) for each k < n. The vertex i 1 is the origin of the path and the vertex i n is its end-point. The digraph is strongly 1-connected from i to R, if there is a dipath with origin i and end-point R. The digraph is strongly 1-connected to R if it is strongly 1-connected from i to R, for all i ∈ V \ {R}.
We assume throughout that the digraph G is strongly 1-connected to R. Clearly, the sender must have a directed path to the receiver to be able to transmit his information.
Moreover, if player i ∈ V\{S, R} has no directed path to the receiver, then i is irrelevant for the transmission of information: either i is a sink or all directed paths starting at i terminate at a sink i = i or loop back to i. Strong 1-connectedness is thus without loss of generality.
With the digraph G, we associate the undirected graph G obtained from G by disregarding the orientation of the edges. An undirected path (simply a path) is a finite sequence of vertices
Definition 5 Given a collection A of subsets of nodes, the digraph G is weakly Aconnected from i to R, if for each A ∈ A, there exists an undirected path from i to R with no vertex in A.
When A is the collection of all subsets with at most k nodes, the undirected graph G is said to be k-connected and the digraph G is said to be weakly k-connected (see e.g. 
Acyclic graphs.
The digraph is acyclic if each vertex appears at most once in each dipath. An important implication of acyclicity is the existence of a timing structure (i.e., an acyclic ordering).
Lemma 1 Let G be acyclic. There exists an integer T and a function
With an acyclic graph, players do not receive feedback about the execution of the protocol. Thus, using the timing structure, we can restrict attention to protocols where each player i sends messages only at round t(i), after having received messages from all his predecessors. Acyclic graphs are central to the proof of Theorem 1. This result gives a simple characterization of secrecy. Remarkably, only the connectivity of the associated undirected network matters (given that the networks is strongly 1-connected to R). Also, requiring detection on top of secrecy does not affect the connectivity requirements.
We prove first (2) ⇒ (1), thereby showing the necessity of weak A-connectedness.
Then, we show that this condition is sufficient, i.e., (1) ⇒ (3). Since (3) obviously implies (2), the proof will be complete.
Proof of necessity[(2) =⇒ (1)]
The main tool is the fundamental next lemma. Suppose that there is a set of vertices A such that all (directed and undirected) paths from S to R intersect A, i.e. A is a cut of the graph. Lemma 2 states that if the histories (of messages sent and received) of the sender, are independent of the histories (of messages sent and received) of A, then the histories of the sender are also independent of the histories (of messages sent and received) of the receiver. The general statement is the following. 
Lemma 2 (Cut)
The proof is in Appendix. A direct implication of the lemma, with S 1 being the sender, S 2 = A and S 3 the receiver, is that the histories of messages sent and received by the receiver are independent of the secret when the histories of messages sent and received by the cut are independent.
While the intuition of the lemma is clear, we could not find a proof in the literature. In particular, let us stress that conditioning on messages both sent and received is crucial. For instance, it can be that the histories of messages sent by the cut are independent of the secret and yet the histories of messages sent and received by the receiver are not. For an example, consider Figure 1 , where θ ∈ {0, 1}, X is a random uniform draw from {0, 1} and addition is modulo 2. The message sent by A is independent of θ (see Lemma 3) 
Now, we prove [(2) =⇒ (1)]. Let us assume that the digraph G is not weakly
A-connected from S to R, that is, there exists a set A ∈ A such that all (directed and undirected) paths from S to R intersect A, i.e. A is a cut. Let ε < 1 − max θ ∈Θ P (θ ) and suppose by contradiction that there exists a protocol σ, θ d that is ε-secret. In particular, this implies that P σ (θ = θ|h
From Lemma 2, for every terminal history h
R , we have:
The history of the sender h A . We obtain:
Using the assumption P σ (θ, h
A ), we get:
i.e., the entire profile of messages received and sent by the cut and the receiver is independent ofθ. In particular, the profile of messages received and sent by the receiver is independent ofθ. It follows thatθ d is independent fromθ and, therefore,
For secrecy, we need
the required contradiction.
Proof of sufficiency[(1) ⇒ (3)]
The proof is constructive and divided into several steps. First, in subsections 3.2.1 to 3.2.4, we construct a protocol for an acyclic digraph and prove that it is 0-secret.
Second, in subsection 3.2.5, we modify it in order to construct a protocol which is 0-secret with δ-detection. Finally, in subsection 3.2.6, we show how to adapt the protocol to any digraph, i.e., without the acyclicity assumption.
The ACY protocol.
In this section, we consider acyclic digraphs and construct a protocol, called ACY, which is 0-secret.
Let us encode all possible values of θ ∈ Θ into binary strings. That is, we assume θ ∈ Θ ⊂ F n for some n, where F denotes the finite field {0, 1} modulo 2. Remark that
x + x = 0 for all x ∈ F n . Throughout, a player is said to draw a key X if he chooses an element in F n at random with equi-probability, independently of all information he may have. Remember that since the graph is acyclic, there exists a well-defined timing structure such that player i is active only at time t(i).
The protocol ACY
• Sender. Chooses a unique k S ∈ C(S) and,
-for each k ∈ C(S) \ {k S }, draws X Sk and sends it to k,
The sender chooses a specific successor k S , sends independent keys to all his successors but k S , and sends (the sum of ) all his information (type, messages received and keys) to k S .
• Player i ∈ V\{S, R}. Chooses a unique k i ∈ C(i) and,
Player i chooses a specific successor k i , sends independent keys to all his successors but k i , and sends (the sum of ) all his information (messages received and keys) to k i .
• Receiver. Computes l∈D(R) m lR .
Receiver computes the sum of all messages received.
Since the graph is strongly 1-connected to R, each player i ∈ V \ {R} has at least one successor, i.e., C(i) = ∅ for each i ∈ V \ {R}, and the protocol is well defined. If a player has a unique successor, he simply sends (the sum of) all his information (and does not draw keys).
Example.
We illustrate the protocol ACY with the example in figure 2:
Let us assume that A is the collection of all subsets of {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} with at most two 
Encoding keys and secret sharing
Before proving secrecy of this protocol, we recall a simple result about the independence of random variables (see e.g., Theorem 8.13 (p. 229) of Shoup (2008)). 
Lemma 3 Let
Since the Y l 's are linearly independent, L ≤ K and the rank of the matrix A = (a lk ) is L. The dimension of its kernel is thus K − L and the cardinality of the kernel is 2 n(K−L) . Then, denoting From point 1, we conclude that the Y l 's are stochastically independent and uniformly distributed. By construction, they are jointly independent fromθ. Then,
and by Lemma 3, the random vector (Y 1 , . . . , Y L ) is independent ofθ and uniformly
A simple method for secret sharing (see Shamir, 1979 ) is easily deduced. Informally, the aim is to "break" a secret θ into a number M of shares in such a way that one can recover the secret from all the shares but not from any subset of shares. 
Lemma 5 (Secret sharing) Letθ be a random variable with values in

The protocol ACY
Each players adds up his information (messages and type, if sender), breaks
it into as many shares as successors, and sends one share to each successor.
ACY is secret
We now prove that the protocol ACY satisfies 0-secrecy.
Lemma 6 Let G be acyclic, strongly 1-connected to R and weakly A-connected from
S to R. The protocol ACY on G is 0-secret.
The proof proceeds in two claims.
Claim 1 Under the ACY protocol, the receiver correctly learns the secret, i.e. with probability one, l∈D(R) m lR =θ
Proof From the definition of the protocol, l∈D(R) m lR is a linear combination ofθ and of the keys drawn by the players. Consider a player i (possibly the sender) and a key X ik , k = k i drawn by player i. This key is sent by i on two edges (ik and ik i ). Each other player j sends received information on exactly one edge. It follows that X ik travels on exactly two directed paths with origin i. Since the graph is acyclic and strongly 1-connected, these two paths must intersect at some point (possibly at R). The player at this point adds up the messages he receives, thus X ik cancels out (X ik + X ik = 0). By contrast,θ travels on exactly one path and is thus received by R.
It remains to prove that no adversary A ∈ A gains additional information about θ.
Claim 2 For any set of players A such that there exists a path from S to R disjoint from A, the messages received by players in A are jointly independent ofθ.
It follows that if the graph is weakly A-connected from S to R, then for each A ∈ A, the messages received by players in A are jointly independent ofθ (since then there exists an undirected path from S to R, disjoint from A). We now prove this claim.
Proof Fix a set of players A such that there exists an undirected path from S to R that contains no element of A. Denote the undirected path P := (i 0 , i 1 , . . . , i k , . . . , i K+1 ), with i 0 = S, i K+1 = R, and i k ∈ A for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K}. We argue that even if the adversary A observes all the shares but the ones sent on the path P, the adversary learns nothing about the secret.
Consider the set of players P
• on the path with no successors on the path, i.e.,
Note that the path changes orientation at those players (nodes). By construction of the protocol ACY (see lemma 5), each player
Assume that the adversary A observes all the shares X ij such that either i ∈ P or j ∈ P or both. In other words, we assume that the adversary observes all possible shares but the ones sent from one player on the path P to another player on the path P.
It follows that the adversary observes all the shares of the players in P • and, thus, learn
Indeed, by construction of the protocol, player i k computes the sum j∈D(i k ) X j,i k , breaks the sum into |C(i k )| shares and sends them to players in C(i k ). Since all the shares sent to players in C(i k ) as well as all the shares (X ji k ) j =i k−1 ,i k+1 are observed by the adversary, the adversary learns Figure 3 .
It follows that A knows (X
• . It is immediate to check that no linear combination of (
The undirected path P.
8 Thus, the adversary cannot recover the share
this means that the adversary learns nothing about the secret (see the second part of Lemma 5).
Alternatively, suppose that i k * = i 0 . We first argue that
In other words, the path P takes the form:
To see this, suppose to the contrary that there exists k such that
i.e., player i k * −k−1 does not send a share to player i k * −k (and, thus, receive a share 
and sends the share
) and the adversary does not learn the share X i k * −1 i k * , it follows that the adversary learns nothing
Lastly, we can iterate the argument to show that the adversary learns nothing about the share X i 0 i 1 and, consequently, about the secret of the sender.
δ-detection.
We show now that one can build on ACY a 0-secret protocol with δ-detection.
Lemma 7
Let G be acyclic, strongly 1-connected to R and weakly A-connected, there exists a 0-secret protocol with δ-detection on G.
Proof We construct a super-protocol which consists in running in parallel a large number N ≥ 1/δ of independent copies of the protocol ACY and where:
• Each player i ∈ V \ {S, R} must play his strategy in each copy of ACY and random draws are independent across copies.
• The sender selects at random one copy with probability 1/N . Then, he inputs the secret in the selected copy and 0 in all the other copies. Without loss of generality, we assume that the set of possible secrets does not include the null
• The receiver computes the output from each copy. If there is only one non-zero output, he lets the decoded secret be this single non-zero value. Otherwise, the receiver concludes that there was a deviation and declares a problem.
From the properties of the protocol ACY, in each copy of the protocol, any adversary A ∈ A receives messages that are independent fromθ. Moreover, these messages are mutually independent across copies. Thus, the adversary gets no information about which copy was selected by the sender. Any deviation manipulates another copy than the one selected by the sender with probability at least 1 − δ and is, therefore, detected since it gives at least two non-zero outputs.
Dispensing with acyclicity
We now explain how to construct a secret protocol on a general digraph. The trick is to associate to the graph G, an auxiliary graph G acy , which is strongly 1-connected, weakly A-connected and acyclic. Then, we show how the protocol ACY on G acy induces the desired protocol on G. We start with the following observation.
Lemma 8 There exists an acyclic and strongly 1-connected sub-graph G a of G.
Proof. For each i ∈ V, consider a shortest directed path from i to R in G. Such a shortest directed path exists since G is strongly 1-connected. Let G a be the collection of all these paths. We claim that G a has the required properties. By construction, it is strongly 1-connected. Let us show that it is acyclic. By contradiction, assume that
, there is no edge Ri for some i ∈ V in G a . It follows that the cycle does not contain the receiver. Then, there exists k ∈ {2, . . . , K} such that the shortest path from i k to R does not follow the cycle (otherwise, R cannot be reached, a contradiction with 1-strong connectedness). Thus, the edge i k i k+1 is not on a shortest path from any player j to R, contradicting the construction of G a .
Let us choose G a to be a maximal acyclic and strongly 1-connected sub-graph of G and let C = G\ G a be the set of edges of G that do not belong to G a . 9 Every edge of C belongs to a cycle of G and every cycle of G contains an edge in C. Let G acy be the
graph obtained from G by replacing each edge ij in C by two edges: i(j)i and i(j)j, where i(j) is a fictitious player who is a duplicate of player i. That is, if ij is in C:
The edges of G a are unchanged. See Figure 4 for an example. By our construction, each fictitious player has only out-going edges, thus cannot belong to a cycle. This implies that the cycle was already a cycle in G and, therefore, it should contain an edge which belongs to C. This is a contradiction because edges in C no longer appear in G acy .
Now, we construct a secret protocol on G by emulating the protocol ACY on G acy .
The timing is the one given by the acyclic structure of G acy . Each player i who has duplicates in G acy should play first for his duplicates (at the first round since duplicates have no predecessors) and then at round t(i) prescribed by the timing structure of G acy . There, he should treat the messages he did choose for his duplicates as messages received by predecessors.
The secrecy of ACY on G acy clearly implies that the induced protocol is secret on G (if a duplicated player belongs to the adversary, the messages sent by his duplicates are independent of the secret and all other messages and thus convey no information).
As in the previous section, one obtains a protocol with δ-detection by running in parallel a large number of independent copies of this protocol.
Security
We now present our main characterization for strong security (the adversary can now deviate from the protocol). Denote 0 A the strategy of the adversary A, which consists in sending the null message, regardless of the history. To get some intuition for Theorem 2, consider the simple example introduced in Figure 5 .
Assume that the adversary is A = {1, 2}. It is clear that if players 1 and 2 stop communicating with the receiver, then the sender cannot communicate at all with the receiver and thus cannot communicate his secret. Thus, for any adversary A, we need at least one directed path from the sender to the receiver that does not intersect A.
However, this is not sufficient to guarantee secrecy. From Theorem 1, for each adversary A , there must exist a path from the sender to the receiver that does not intersect A to guarantee secrecy. So, if the adversary A stops communicating, we would need the sub-graph G\A to be weakly A-connected if we want achieve strong security. Theorem 2 states that it is not only a sufficient condition, but also a necessary one. Moreover, Theorem 2 also states that simple faults (i.e., to simply stop communicating) are the worst possible deviations.
We prove first sufficiency (1) ⇒ (2), then necessity (3) ⇒ (1), (2) ⇒ (3) is obvious.
Sufficiency [(1) =⇒ (2)]
Fix ε > 0 and set ε = ε/|A|. Since for each A ∈ A, the graph G \ A contains a sub-graph that is strongly connected and weakly A-connected from S to R, Theorem 
R ) ∈ Θ, i.e., the first adversary for which the receiver does not detect a problem in the protocol σ
This protocol is 0-secret by construction: each sub-protocol σ A , θ R ) = B, the receiver outputs a wrong value from the full protocol. Thus, the probability of wrong output is at most the probability that there exists B ∈ A such that A * (h
=θ, which is at most |A|ε = ε. Thus, σ, θ d is ε-strongly secure.
Necessity [(3) ⇒ (1)]
The key of the proof is the following lemma.
Lemma 9 Consider two disjoint subsets of nodes U and V . Let U be the set of nodes
, and for every history h
The proof is in Appendix. The intuitive meaning of this lemma is the following.
Nodes in U are separated from V by U , in the sense that messages from nodes in U to recipients in V are "filtered" by nodes in U . If U adopts the strategy 0 U , then all nodes in U send no message and therefore communication from U to V is disrupted.
Consequently, the messages received by V do not depend on the strategy used by U .
We prove now [(3) ⇒ (1) We apply Lemma 9 with U = A * , U = A * and V = {R} ∪ A. It follows that
A ) does not depend on τ A * and thus, we may assume without loss of generality that τ A * = 0 A * . (Note that there is no directed path from a node in A * to a node in A that does not intersect A * , since any node in A has a directed path to R in G \ ( A * ∪ A * ).) We claim that there cannot exist an ε-strongly secure protocol. By contradiction, suppose that for ε > 0, there exists a protocol σ, θ d which is ε-strongly secure. This means that
From Lemma 9, this implies
This means that the protocol induced by 0
connected but not weakly A-connected. The proof is thus complete.
Open questions
A weaker notion of security
As already alluded to, our notion of strong security is more stringent that the classical definition of security, which is as follows.
Definition 6 A protocol σ, θ d is ε-secure if it satisfies the following requirements:
1. The receiver learns the secret with probability at least 1 − ε, i.e., for all A ∈ A,
No adversary gets information about the secret, i.e., for all
A protocol is ε-secure if the receiver learns the secret with arbitrarily high probability, regardless of the behavior of adversary. Moreover, no adversary can gain information by deviating. However, if an adversary deviates from the protocol, information may be leaked to other players. In other words, by contrast with the concept of strong security, secrecy is not maintained when adversaries deviate from the protocol.
To see the difference between security and strong security, consider the graph G below with A the set of all singletons. The graph G \ {3} does not contain a sub-graph that is strongly connected and weakly A-connected, while all others do. From Theorem 2, there is therefore no strongly ε-secure protocol on G for all ε > 0. Yet, we claim that ε-security can be achieved. -If the test succeeds, he sends (θ + X 1 + X 5 , ok) to player 6.
-If the test fails, he sends (θ + X 1 , problem) to player 6.
All other players are inactive.
Round 6.
-If player 6 receives a message with "ok," he sends (θ + X 1 + X 5 + X 1 , ok) to the receiver R.
-If player 6 receives a message with "problem," he sends (θ+X 1 +X 1 , problem)
to the receiver R.
Round 7.
-If the receiver R receives a message with "ok," he decodes (θ + X 1 + X 5 + X 1 ) + X 5 .
-If the receiver R receives a message with "problem," he decodes (θ+X 1 +X 1 ).
Clearly, if all players abide by the sub-protocol, the receiver correctly learns the secret. Moreover, if player 3 deviates from the sub-protocol, the deviation is detected
. The probability of detection can be made arbitrarily large, in particular larger than 1 − ε, by taking keys in F n for n large enough.
Finally, the receiver fixes an arbitrary order on the six sub-protocols and decodes the secret according to the first sub-protocol for which no deviation is detected. If the receiver detects a deviation in all sub-protocols, he decodes the secret according to the sub-protocol constructed for the adversary {3}. By construction, the probability that an adversary deviates from the protocol and is not detected is at most ε, so that we indeed achieve ε-security. However, we do not achieve strong ε-security. To see this, suppose that the adversary is player 3. Note that he is active in all sub-protocols. If he deviates in all sub-protocols, the deviation is detected with probability at least 1 − ε, in which case the receiver correctly learns the secret from player 6 (in the execution of the sub-protocol constructed for 3). However, in this case, player 6 also learns the secret, which violates strong ε-security.
An open problem is to characterize the directed graphs for which ε-security can be achieved for all ε > 0.
Perfect security
Another open problem is to characterize the networks for which 0-secrecy and 0-strong security can be achieved. To formulate a guess, let us assume that A is the set of coalitions with at most k elements, and compare our conditions with those of Dolev et al. (1993) . 10 We recall that they only treat networks with vertex disjoint paths, that is, graphs made of parallel lines. Yet, their conditions give intuitions for the general case.
The condition in our main theorem is similar to weak 2k +1-connectivity: removing 2k nodes does not disconnect the sender from the receiver in the undirected graph. This is analogous to the result of 
Proof Let G be a directed graph and G the undirected graph obtained from G.
Assume that G is connected. Consider three disjoint subsets S 1 , S 2 and S 3 of players such that all paths from players in S 1 to players in S 3 intersects S 2 , i.e., S 2 is a cut of the graph G. Let S * 1 (resp., S * 3 ) be the connected component of G \ S 2 that includes S 1 (resp., S 3 ). Since S 2 is a cut, we have that S * .
So, we want to prove that for any σ, for any t, for any h t , we have
We first prove Lemma 2 for an auxiliary game with three players: 1, 2 and 3. We may think of player i in that auxiliary game as a representative of the players in the The action a corresponds to the messages sent by nodes in S 1 to nodes in S 1 , while the action α corresponds to the messages sent by nodes in S 1 to S 2 . Similarly, the action β corresponds to the messages sent by nodes in S 2 to nodes in S 1 , the action b to the messages sent by nodes in S 2 to S 2 and the action γ to the messages sent by nodes in S 2 to S 3 . Lastly, the action c corresponds to the messages sent by nodes in S 3 to S 3 and the action δ to the messages sent by nodes in S 3 to nodes in S 2 .
A t-period history is a vector h t = ( 
The proof is by induction on t. Let t = 1 and consider the history
We have
, which establishes the statement for t = 1.
Let us suppose that the statement is true for t, i.e., P σ (h t )P σ (h
Firstly, we have
Secondly, we have that 
From equations (1), (2) and (3), we obtain: To complete the proof, it is enough to adapt the strategies to the information players actually have and to interpret the actions as messages sent and received (remember that Lemma 2 holds for the auxiliary game, regardless of the strategy profile).
Lemma 9
Consider two disjoint subsets of nodes U and V . Let U be the set of nodes i ∈ V \ U such that all directed paths from i to some j ∈ V , go through U .
For all τ U ,τ U , σ −(U ∪ U ) , and for every history h T +1 V of V , we have
Proof First, note that U is disjoint from V and that V ⊆ V := V \ (U ∪ U ).
Moreover, for each i ∈ V and each j ∈ D(i), we have j / ∈ U . To see this, suppose that j ∈ U . If there exists a directed path from i to k ∈ V that does not intersect U , then there exists a path from j to k ∈ V that does not intersect U , a contradiction with j ∈ U . So, either all directed paths from i to any k ∈ V intersect U or there is no directed path from i to k ∈ V . From the definition of U , it follows that i ∈ U , a contradiction with i ∈ V since V and U are disjoint.
It follows that ∪ i∈V D(i) := D(V ) ⊆ V ∪ U .
Recall that h t i denotes an history of messages sent and received by node i up to round t and let h t V := (h t i ) i∈V the profile of histories of nodes in V . We complete the proof by induction on t. For t = 2, we clearly have that P 0 U ,τ U ,σ V (h 
